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Abstract  
 
This paper summarises, and attempts to theorise, the findings of a series of research 
projects investigating accounting practices across the public sector in Tanzania. Data 
was collected principally by interviewing participants in central and local government 
and in a number of NGO’s. Analysis was undertaken using grounded theory methods, 
alongside a theoretical framework. This framework comprised the work of the post-
colonial theorist Ekeh (1975, 1992, 1994a, 1994b) and the concepts of legitimacy, 
loose coupling and isomorphism from institutional theory. Legitimacy and loose 
coupling were central concerns in all the institutions and played a significant role in 
understanding their accounting practices. However, there were significant differences 
between the settings’ responses. These can be partly explained as responses to 
different isomorphistic pressures. Differences between institutions can be further 
explained using Ekeh’s concepts of the primordial and the civic publics. Gaming and 
corruption were evident in central government, associated more with the civic public. 
Accountability and a sense of moral responsibility appeared to be stronger in NGOs, 
which were more closely associated with the primordial public. In contrast to the 
central government, which was associated more with the civic public, accounting was 
extremely problematic resulting in many dysfunctional practices. However gaming 
and corruption were most evident in local government where participants were subject 
to a conflict between the two publics’ moralities. 
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The ‘Two Publics’ and Institutional theory– A Study of Public Sector 
Accounting in Tanzania 
 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
 
This research investigates accounting practices and changes in different institutional 
settings concerned with the provision of public services in a developing country, 
Tanzania. Poverty reduction is a major concern in Tanzania and accounting practices 
have a direct effect on poverty reduction by ensuring resources are appropriately and 
efficaciously targeted. Appropriate accounting practices can also help to counter 
corruption as recognised by the World Bank, ‘growing awareness of the corrosive 
effects of corruption…has given new urgency to donors’ need to ensure that aid is not 
diverted to private ends or misallocated to activities not conducive to fostering growth 
and reducing poverty’ (Allen, Schiavo-Campo and Garrity 2003). Good accounting 
practices are also important in legitimising organisations in the eyes of donors (Assad 
and Goddard 2006). Such organisations are more likely to attract additional external 
funding, enabling greater poverty reduction. This research contributes to a better and 
deeper understanding of accounting practices across the spectrum of public services in 
one developing country. 
 
Much of the literature in this area has been normative (DFID, 2001, OECD, 2005, 
Allen, Schiavo-Campo and Garrity 2003, ODI 2004, 2007, Brookings Institution 2006 
and the Economic Commission for Africa 2003), comprising the exhortation for 
developing countries to adopt various schema Many of these exhortations are 
accompanied by prescriptions of models of financial management and all emphasise 
the importance of accountability. However, some accounting academics have noted 
the lack of success of such approaches in developed countries, let alone in developing 
countries. They have questioned whether such models are effective at all and 
suggested a more cautious approach based on first obtaining a better understanding of 
accounting and accountability practices in the context of developing countries. A 
situation appears to have been reached where aid agencies are insisting on the 
implementation of accounting practices which are unproven in the developed world 
and which may not take sufficient cognisance of local contexts. 
 
As early as 1989 Dean was warning against the crude transfer of accounting 
techniques from the West to developing countries (Dean 1989). Sarker (2006) found 
that new public management in general was successful in the more developed context 
of Singapore but achieved very little in the less developed economy of Bangladesh. 
He suggests the existence of a formal market economy, the rule of law, and an 
advanced, efficient level of administrative infrastructure are necessary precursors for 
NPM success. These are rarely present in poor developing countries. Uddin and 
Hopper (2003) researched World Bank claims that NPM initiatives such as 
privatisation, could improve management controls, commercial performance, and 
development. In fact, privatisation appeared to be a relative failure in gaining theses 
intended benefits. Manning (2001) suggests that the marginal nature of the impact of 
NPM may be due to limited public expectations and hurried implementation. 
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There are a number of papers which investigate public sector reform in specific 
developing countries. Alam and Lawrence (1994) argued that Western budgetary 
processes were incongruent in a Bangladeshi context. In their study of a Fiji 
Telecommunications company, Sharma, Lawrence, and Fowler (2012) found that the 
cultural conflicts and political influences led to the new public management process 
being resisted and modified to reduce the tension between economic and social 
relations. Batley and Larbi (2004) examined reforms in Africa, South and Southeast 
Asia, and Latin America. They conclude that reform approaches need to be sensitive 
to the institutional conditions of particular countries. Therkildsen (2000) investigated 
public sector reform in Tanzania, and argues that there was fragile domestic political 
support for these reforms and few service delivery improvements. Substantial external 
influences, fragmented domestic policy-making, weak links between policy-making 
and its implementation, and questionable assumptions about NPM-inspired reform 
measures, were identified as the causes of these shortcomings. Uddin and Tsamenyi 
(2005) studied the impact of World Bank sponsored reform in a state owned 
enterprise in Ghana. They found that budgetary practices ‘remained politicised, 
delayed, directionless and ineffective’ (p 648). Rahaman and Lawrence (2001) go 
further by establishing that even where Western standards of technical accounting 
exist, they merely ‘masked deeper deficiencies’ of financial management within the 
socio- political context of Ghana. 
 
Furthermore, Awio, Lawrence, and Northcott (2007) examined the Ugandan 
community-led approach of an HIV/AIDS initiative. They concluded that developing 
countries need to import relevant and workable aspects of NPM reforms, while at the 
same time exploring other options for services and programme areas that apply to 
unique circumstances. Roberts and Andrews (2005) found that reform began in Ghana 
but faltered after an initial period of progress. This was due to a number of factors 
including reform ownership and political will, organisational integration and 
organisational incentives, and strategic capacity. In Malawi, Durevall and Erlandsson 
(2005) found that public sector finance management reform focused on improving the 
technical aspects of the budget system, while largely ignoring the preferences and 
incentives of the different actors. 
 
Whilst acknowledging the more recent emergence of critical accounting literature on 
Africa, Rahaman (2010) highlights the paucity of studies in this area in the special 
issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting in 2010. He also suggests that corruption 
in the continent is an important issue that needs some attention from the critical 
accounting community. A few studies have addressed the issue of corruption and 
accounting in developing countries. Quah (2001) noted that fighting corruption is one 
of targeted improvements of NPM in developing countries. However, only three 
Asian countries – Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia – have succeeded in 
minimising it. Tambulasi (2007) investigated the extent to which NPM-based 
management accounting practices have increased managerial autonomy and reduced 
political control in Malawi’s local governance. He found that the NPM-based 
management accounting has led to loss of local political control, which makes 
politicians resort to unproductive behaviours including interference, sabotage and 
corruption in order to regain their lost political control. On the other hand, 
administrators maintain their managerial autonomy through NPM- based managerial 
prerogative, seeking central government intervention and colluding with councillors 
in corrupt activities. Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010) found that in the Nigerian public 
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sector, though there had been some initiatives in strengthening existing institutions 
and creating new ones with responsibility for fraud and other controls, the issue of 
weak accounting infrastructure had not been addressed. 
 
Many other contextual factors which have a significant effect on accounting practices 
in developing countries have been identified in the literature including cultural 
factors, ethnicity, political interference, nepotism, and over-bureaucracy (Uddin and 
Hopper, 2001, 2003; Rahaman and Lawrence 2001; Wickramasinghe and Hopper 
2005, Hopper et al 2009). However, very few of these studies were focused on central 
or local government accounting and this area is severely under-researched.   
 
Abdul-Rahaman et al (1997) suggest that research into public sector accounting in 
developing countries is overly Eurocentric and exhort a more balanced approach to 
such research which steers a path between excessive relativism and crude 
ethnocentrism. They exhort more empirical and interpretive work within the socio-
political contexts of particular developing countries. Rahaman and Lawrence (2001) 
note the urgent need for local critiques of public sector accounting, adopting a deeper, 
qualitative approach, to aid understanding of developing countries financial 
management. Olson, Humphries and Guthrie (2001) note that not only are there very 
few empirical studies of public sector accounting in developing countries but also 
very few seek to construct appropriate theories. The research presented here addresses 
these lacunae. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the perceptions and practices emanating 
from the introduction on NPM inspired reforms in the public sectors of developing 
countries within a post-colonial setting. The research was concerned with the 
comparative contribution of accounting in the three different institutional settings of 
central government, local government and NGOs. The empirics were obtained from 
grounded theory studies in these settings and are analysed through the lens of Ekeh’s 
concepts of ‘two publics’, supported by the concepts of legitimacy, isomorphism and 
loose coupling from Institutional Theory. The research also explores the relationship 
between Ekeh’s concepts and institutional theory.  
 
Tanzania is an ideal country for researching accounting practices in developing 
countries as it is attempting to implement many NPM oriented accounting reforms. 
This includes regulatory initiatives such as the Public Financial Management Reform 
Programme (PFMRP), the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and the 
Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) in central government and the Local 
Government Reform Programme (LGRP). This enabled a broader understanding of 
the range of institutional settings providing public services. Research undertaken by 
Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) into implementation of the LG framework 
reports some success but suggests there is still a long way to go. The recently 
published Country Self Assessment Report (CSAR 2009) for Tanzania, which is part 
of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) noted low levels of accountability in 
the Tanzanian public sector, leading to corruption.  
 
This research was predicated on the belief that a sound appreciation of the role and 
potential impact of accounting can only be developed by reference to the particular 
setting in which it is embedded. The paper is structured as follows. It commences with 
an explanation of the theoretical framework used in the paper, particularly concepts 
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taken from Ekeh (1975, 1992, 1994a, 1994b) but enhanced by Institutional Theory, to 
more fully understand the African context. The methods used to undertake the 
empirical work are then outlined. The empirical findings are next presented taking 
each institutional setting (CG, LG, NGO) in turn and are discussed in relation to the 
theoretical framework. A further discussion comparing the institutional setting is 
undertaken before concluding with an outline of the contributions Ekeh and IT make 
to understanding NPM implementation in developing countries. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and Prior research 
 
2.1 The ‘two publics’ 
 
Ekeh (1975) develops his theory from an analysis of colonial and post colonial states 
in Africa. The colonial state was distant from African society which was based on 
kinship. It did not engage with the values of indigenous societies on the grounds that 
these were primitive and needed reshaping. African society ‘regarded the colonial 
state with ambivalence...and had grave misgivings about its morality, preferring the 
communal values engendered by Africa’s kinship systems to what they regarded as 
self centred European morality. There were indeed no moral linkages between the 
colonial state and African societies’ and ‘ the individual had no room for political and 
cultural activities within the civil colonial apparatus of the colonial state (the civic 
public)’ (Ekeh 1994, p240). Under these circumstances the primordial public 
emerged, under which an individual could be a ‘worthy citizen....morally bound to his 
society defined in terms of broadened kinship groups’ (p241).  Individuals, and 
particularly those working in the public sector, ‘have to operate in both publics, 
switching from moral actions in the primordial public to amoral postures in the civic 
public’. Ekeh (1994) further asserts that these two publics still dominate public affairs 
in post colonial Africa and that the post colonial state resembles the colonial state, 
maintaining its distance from African society. Osaghae (2003) and Afolayan (2012) 
suggest that the theory of the two publics has become even more relevant and timeless 
since Ekeh first developed the concepts. 
 
The existence of the two publics has further consequences for the public sector. First, 
state determined taxation was regarded as an alien imposition and a punishment rather 
than as a citizen’s duty which also qualified the payee to receive social benefits. In 
contrast community and ethnic taxes emerging from the primordial public were 
accepted. This, in turn, means that state taxes are not considered a collective good and 
misuse and corrupt practices associated with such funds are not resented to such an 
extent as they would be in the West. Ekeh (1994) identifies two forms of corruption in 
Africa. The first is ‘the conventional problem...involving the abuse of public office for 
personal and private gain’, which could be overcome using conventional means. 
However the second form is more intractable ‘in which the resources and funds of the 
inclusive civic public are diverted for the use of the more restricted primordial public 
by officials’ and is widely accepted as legitimate. The two forms are intertwined 
leading to a difficulty in overcoming the former. Public officials who enrich their 
primordial grouping to the detriment of the civic public are hailed as heroic. However 
those who ‘uphold the norms of conduct in the civic public are by their impartiality 
condemned in their primordial public’. This places those operating in the public sector 
in an almost impossible position.    
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The two publics also have their own sectoral institutions. The primordial public’s 
main institutions are ethnic, communal and hometown development associations 
which evolved to fill the gaps created by colonialism to provide public services the 
state failed to deliver. Such institutions include most NGOs. The distinguishing 
characteristics of the primordial institutions are a strong sense of ownership and a 
resistance to state intrusion and a strong moral purpose including a moral 
responsibility on the part of individuals to ensure collective well being. The civic 
public is closely related to the state and related institutions include central government 
institutions such as the civil service, police, military and other state agencies. 
However, it is broader than just the state and is meant to capture the totality of the 
non-native public whose institutions are governed by legal-rational rules. Moreover, 
‘an ‘us’ versus ‘they’ differentiation characterises relations between the people and 
the civic public which is amoral and lacks the moral imperatives of the primordial 
public. Osaghae (2006) argues that this amorality is conducive to the opportunistic, 
lawless and corrupt tendencies that have come to characterise the public sector. 
Individuals working in this sector feel no moral urge to reciprocate the benefits they 
receive leading to morally reprehensible behaviour such as embezzlement. This 
behaviour is tolerated as long as it benefits the primordial public. 
 
It seems reasonable to suggest that the perceptions and practices of accounting for 
funds in institutions provided by public services in the two publics will therefore be 
different. CG places emphasis on legal/rational rules which is contrary to the cultural 
values of most of the participants (particularly those lower down the hierarchy) who 
are rooted in the primordial public. Moreover, the civic state is not only by its nature 
amoral but has participants in influential positions who are expected to employ state 
resources to further private and communal interest. Accounting is likely to be far less 
problematic in NGOs rooted in the primordial public. Participants do not face the 
same tensions as those in central government as the institutions in which they operate 
are conducive to their primordial roots and values and a stronger sense of moral 
responsibility might exist. Corruption might also be expected to be less of an issue 
other than a desire to subvert resources from the civic public wherever possible. 
Accounting in local government might be expected to be particularly problematic as it 
comprises strong elements of both publics and officials are likely to be caught by the 
conflict between the two. 
 
There is no prior research using Ekeh’s concepts to study accounting. However, there 
are several papers concerned with corruption and accounting in developing countries. 
Some, such as  Iyoha and Oyerinde  (2010), take a traditional approach to corruption 
where it is assumed organisational and accounting practices can be used to enhance 
accountability and reduce corruption. Others such as Pillay and Kluvers (2014) take a 
broader view incorporating organisational culture. However Everett (2012) and 
Everett, Neu, and Rahaman (2007) note the importance of taking a more 
comprehensive view of corruption than the narrow self-interest approach normally 
adopted by accountants.  
 
‘A private interest view (of corruption) has accountants focusing their attention on 
efficiency….This view is rooted in competition and personal gain…Missing from this 
perspective however, is a concern for the ‘bigger picture’ of corruption, specifically 
the role that colonial relations have played in developing countries…’ 
        Everett (2012, p. 237) 
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Such an approach accepts that corruption is to a large extent, socially defined. 
However there are very few studies of the nature of this ‘bigger picture’ and how it 
interrelates with organisational and accounting practices. Within the development 
literature Doig and Mclvor (1999) also note the importance of studies of corruption in 
practice and the: 
  
‘need to examine the practical effect of broad macro-reforms and understand 
that corruption is not only an inherent aspect of political life but also an 
invariable negative aspect, if not in the short term then in the longer term.‘ 
 
It has been suggested that Tanzanian attitudes towards such issues as politics, 
transparency, corruption and accountability are different to those found in the West. 
For example, Lawson and Rakner (2005, p. 19) found that ‘a (Tanzanian) leader who 
acts as a patriarch, providing material benefits to the community, may enjoy a great 
deal of legitimacy, even if the benefits he or she distributes are corruptly acquired. 
Conversely, leaders who struggle to uphold the ideals of transparency and good 
governance, but do not materially provide, may be rejected by their community and 
regarded as unaccountable’. While conducting a survey on Tanzania citizens’ 
attitudes on political and economic reforms, Chaligha et al. (2002, p. vi) also found 
that ‘widespread perceptions of corruption coexisted with even more widespread 
expressions of trust in public institutions’. 
 
Use of Ekeh’s concepts allow a far broader and deeper understanding of corruption 
which is seen to be complex and at least partly rooted in post colonial societal 
phenomena.   
 
2.2 Institutional theory 
 
However, Ekeh has little to say about organisational practices. In recent years, 
Institutional Theory (IT) has been used extensively in studies in public sector 
accounting (Van Helden 2005, Jacobs 2012). IT is a powerful theory when it comes to 
explaining the adoption of innovations by “institutionalized organizations”. In a 
classic IT study, Modell (2001) used IT to study performance measurement reforms in 
the Norwegian healthcare sector. He drew upon Oliver’s (1991) conceptual 
framework of managerial responses to organisational changes. Others (Hoque 2005, 
Gomes et al., 2008, (Modell et al., 2006,2007, Ezzamel et al.’s 2007, Nor-Aziah and 
Scapens 2007, Hopper and Major, 2007) have since undertaken IT informed studies in 
various settings in the public sector but very few in developing countries and none 
have compared reform implementation using IT across different public sector settings.   
In many ways legitimacy is at the heart of IT. Organizational actors adopt and 
implement innovations because of legitimacy and efficiency (Powell 1985; Covaleski 
and Dirsmith 1988; Oliver 1991; Powell 1991; Tsamenyi, Cullen et al. 2006). Scott 
views legitimacy as essentially, ‘a symbolic value to be displayed in a manner such 
that it is visible to outsiders’ (Scott 1998 p 211). He further indentifies three ‘pillars’ 
(or ways of understanding) institutions and legitimacy. The first has a regulatory 
emphasis on conformity to rules, the second normative pillar stresses a deeper, moral 
base for assessing legitimacy, where controls are internalised. Finally there is a 
cognitive-cultural pillar which stresses the legitimacy which comes from adopting a 
common frame of reference (Scott 2001). As early as 1994, Bealing (1994) and 
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Lapsley (1994) identified the importance of legitimacy in the US Security and 
Exchange Commission and in the UK NHS respectively. More recently, Hoque 
(2005) investigated the relationship between legitimacy and efficiency following 
NPM inspired accounting reforms in Australian local government. 
 
Another useful IT concept is that of loose-coupling. This occurs when the established 
rules are not coupled to the actual practices, often due to power conflicts and self-
interests (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; Burns and Scapens 2000, Collier 2001; 
Tsamenyi, Cullen et al. 2006). Loose coupling refers to the separation of symbolic 
display for external, legitimacy-seeking purposes from operating-level practices and 
actions in organization and organizations tend to respond to institutional pressures by 
‘ceremonial conformity’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Bromley and Powell (2012), 
suggest that new policies are often adopted yet the follow-up implementation, 
evaluation and monitoring process are simply absent or are ceremonial acts that they 
can hardly affect the operational routines. There have been several papers reporting 
loose coupling in the public sector. Some suggest that loose coupling is inherent in all 
organisations (Carruthers, 1995; Johnsen et al., 2001; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; 
Kasperskaya, 2008; Johnsson and Siverbo, 2009). Others suggest it depends on the 
organizational context and can be triggered by power struggles (Modell, 2003), 
operating-level resistance (Siti Nabiha and Scapens, 2005) or coercive pressure from 
stakeholders (Chang, 2006).  
  
One of the principle tenets of IT (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991) is that of isomorphism which refers to the tendency for organisations in similar 
fields to adopt similar forms and procedures in order to obtain legitimacy. This results 
in organisations being subjected to isomorphic pressure to adopt such forms. 
Isomorphism may be coercive, when an organization adopts certain norms because of 
pressures exerted by other organizations and by society in general; mimetic when 
organizations intentionally imitate and copy one another in response to uncertainty or 
normative isomorphism, when organizations indirectly adopt the norms and values of 
other organizations as a result of professionalisation. Isomorphism is useful in 
understanding the relationship between external factors and organizational practices 
such of accounting and accountability. Traditionally IT posited that accountability is 
enforced on organisations by external factors such as professional associations and the 
state. Organisations absorb these pressures and once they can demonstrate that they 
have rational accountability mechanisms they are deemed to be legitimate, ensuring 
their longevity. However, this absorption by organisations may be superficial and 
leave the values, beliefs and practices of actors unchanged (DiMaggio 1988). 
 
Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) found that public sector organizations in the US, 
when compared with organizations in the business sectors are more vulnerable to all 
three types of institutional isomorphistic forces. Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge 
(2007) found that substantial evidence of compliance but more limited support for 
convergence when studying isomporhism with respect to an NPM reform in English 
local government. Ramanath (2008), in a study of Indian NGOs, found that despite an 
emerging isomorphism in structures and processes, a closer look at specific 
organizational interventions suggested a less uniform pattern of organizational 
adaptation. Gomes et al (2008) noted the importance of coercive isomorphism and the 
consequent institutionalization of accounting practices in Portuguese central 
government. 
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Recently, Jacobs (2012) has noted the interest is using IT alongside other theoretical 
approaches to study organisations. Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) use the concept of 
loose coupling together with actor-network theory, while Hopper and Major (2007) 
combine institutional theory with economics, labour process and actor network 
theories. However, almost all the above studies and certainly those focused on 
accounting in the public sector have been researched in developed economies. The 
cultural, political and social environments of developing countries are very different 
and need to be taken into account when researching institutions in such contexts. One 
obvious difference is the post colonial context of many developing countries. Within 
an African post-colonial context Ekeh’s (1975) theory of two publics is relevant to 
this research and can enhance the insights obtained from IT.  
 
2.3 Combining the two theoretical approaches 
 
It is clear from the above overview that morality and cultural values are central to 
both Ekeh’s concept of ‘two publics’ and IT concepts of legitimacy. However, the 
focus of the two sets of concepts is different. Ekeh is concerned with a very broad 
post-colonial setting which impinges on individuals’ sense of morality and cultural 
values. IT is self-evidently more focused on institutions and their relationship with 
their societal setting. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 122) defined organisational 
legitimacy as follows: 
 
‘Organizations seek to establish congruence between the social values 
associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable 
behavior in the larger social system of which they are a part. Insofar as these 
two value systems are congruent we can speak of organizational legitimacy. 
When an actual or potential disparity exists between the two value systems, 
there will exist a threat to organizational legitimacy.’ 
 
Ekeh’s analysis allows a more thorough understanding of the social values and the 
norms of acceptable behaviour which constitute legitimacy found in this complex, 
post colonial setting.  It may also throw light on potential disparities, for instance 
where the mortalities of the two public are in opposition. The reason that the 
perceptions and practices of accounting for funds in institutions provided by public 
services in the three settings studied may be underpinned by the different conceptions 
of legitimacy emanating from the two publics and the conflicts between these 
conceptions and that associated with NPM. The different moral and cultural values of 
the ‘two publics’ may also assist a better understanding of loose coupling and 
isomorphism. Loose coupling is likely to be more dominant where tensions exist 
within institutions where the conflict between the two publics is most evident, as in 
local government. Isomorphism is likely to be most evident where concepts of 
legitimacy between institutions and NPM are shared as in central government. It 
should also be noted that, Dowling and Pfeffer’s definition of legitimacy omits the 
importance of the institution’s external funders, who have yet another set of values 
and norms emanating from the global NPM movement. 
 
It is clear that more empirical knowledge and understanding of accounting practices is 
needed which incorporates the importance of the moral, cultural, political, economic 
and social context.  Moreover, prior studies have been undertaken in just one part of 
the public sector and no study has compared reform implementation across different 
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public sector settings. Such research needs an appropriate methodology which enables 
a deeper knowledge and understanding of accounting practices in their contexts to 
emerge, together with that of participants’ perceptions of these practices. Adoption of 
Ekeh’s insights, together with IT, particularly the concepts of legitimacy, 
isomorphism and loose coupling, enabled the researchers to understand and evaluate 
the impact of new accounting practices at both the surface and deeper levels in each 
organisational setting. It also allowed the post colonial context of accounting and 
accountability to be better understood.  
 
3. Research Programme and Methodology 
 
3.1 Case study setting 
 
Tanzania became a multi-party democracy in 1992, after about thirty years of single 
political party dominance. The introduction of multi-party system appeared to change 
the Tanzanian political landscape for the better, but the dominance of one political 
party rule has continued to date (Nyirabu, 2002; Whitehead, 2009). The historical 
trajectory of the Tanzania governance system and public institutional traditions has 
very much been influenced by the Westminster model, which was adopted after 
gaining independence from her last colonial master (i.e. United Kingdom) in 1961 
(Lienert, 2007). Tanzania has a parliament, a written constitution and a relatively 
powerful presidential system with cabinet ministers making the central government. 
The president is both the head of state and head of government. Overall, in matters of 
country policies and public administration, Tanzanian Constitution delegates more 
power to the president and cabinet ministers than, for example, the parliament, local 
government authorities (LGAs) and the judiciary (Tanzania, 1997; 2013). 
Furthermore, key executive position holders are appointed, mainly based on political 
affiliation with the ruling party. 
 
LGAs were established in 1961, abolished in 1972, and reinstated in 1982. In 1984, 
constitutional ammendments were made to reinstate power to the people which 
established city, municipal, town and district councils, and devolved political, 
financial and administrative powers to these LGAs (Tanzania, 1997, Articles 8, 145 
and 146). Currently, LGAs are responsible for public services like the provision of 
primary school education, maintenance and construction of infrastructure, livestock 
and agricultural services, health services, water supply services, waste and 
environment management, and economic empowerment through training and 
provision of soft loans and premises for small-scale traders. 
 
Tanzanian development policies are guided by the ‘Tanzania Development Vision 
2025’, which is a development policy document formulated and adopted in 1995. This 
document aims to guide Tanzania to achieve a certain level of development by 2025. 
Despite opening the economy to the private sector during the 1990s and the GDP 
growth of about 5% to 7% per annum, Tanzanian economy remains weak. This could 
be argued as one of the main reasons for the continued dependency on foreign sources 
of finance for the Tanzanian government budget. For example, it is documented that 
Tanzania receives foreign official development assistance from more than 40 
development partners (World Bank, 2011), and is the second largest recipient of aid in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Tripp, 2012).  
 
11 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
A core aspect of the research reported here was to study accounting practices within a 
variety of public service contexts. The paper investigates these practices and 
discourses in three institutional settings of central government, local government and 
NGOs in Tanzania. The research entailed an in depth, empirical study of practicing 
stakeholders. Three independent grounded theory studies were undertaken, one in 
each institutional setting. Interviews were undertaken with managers and 
politicians/Board members who were involved with any aspect of accounting. Data 
was collected in central functions such as Treasury/Finance and senior civil 
servants/Chief Executives and from service departments where appropriate. In total 
70 interviews were undertaken in central government, 71 in local government and 48 
in NGO’s. A description of accounting and accountability practices in each 
organisation was obtained, together with participants’ perceptions of these phenomena 
and practices.  Triangulation was undertaken by a document search of relevant 
publications and committee minutes including budget, financial and audit reports and 
accounting system reports. Whenever possible, observation was also undertaken, 
including non participant observation and attendance at significant meetings. 
  
The data was analysed using the series of coding procedures suggested by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) comprising three different stages of coding. The first stage of open 
coding produced a set of codes which played a role in the case organisation’s life with 
respect to accounting and accountability. The second stage of axial coding 
concentrated on the relationships between codes to produce a set of main categories. 
Reducing the number of categories at this stage allowed for a higher level of 
abstraction to be reached. Categories were derived from the data (in vivo codes) or by 
the researchers’ knowledge of relevant Institutional Theory (theoretical codes). A 
final stage of selective coding identified the core category or phenomenon around 
which all other categories operated. It provided the core to understanding what was 
going on in the organisation. Selective coding also identified the strategies used by the 
organisation participants to manage the core phenomenon.  
 
4. Findings 
 
The analysis revealed different approaches to accounting in each of the settings. The 
findings commence with an outline of each sector’s context and the isomorphistic 
pressures faced. Next, a summarised version of the grounded theory which emerged 
from each setting is presented. This comprises the core phenomenon found in each 
institutional setting, together with the strategies adopted by participants to manage 
these phenomena. Perceptions of legitimacy loose coupling are also discussed and an 
analysis of each sector using Ekeh’s theory is undertaken.  
 
4.1 Central government 
 
In central government the research focused on three NPM inspired reforms of 
budgeting practices; performance budgeting (PB), cash budgeting (CB), and a 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Three main ministries were 
investigated: the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA), the Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) and the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (MoHSW). CB was adopted as the result of coercive pressure from the IMF. 
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PB and MTEF were adopted later. PB was introduced by the World Bank after a 
Public Expenditure Review (PER). Implementation of PB and MTEF was an 
extension of the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP). Donors were the overseers 
of reform implementation and their willingness to continue financing depended upon 
the Government’s successful adoption and implementation of the reforms. In return 
for funding, international organizations and DPs expected satisfactory progress in the 
reforms implementation, as indicated in one of the Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoU) between the Government and the DPs: 
[…] To sustain external support DPs expect the Government to demonstrate 
continued progress in its core public service reforms. This includes the public 
service, financial management, legal sector, local government, good governance 
and anti corruption reform programmes and strengthening of expenditure and 
accountability systems […] (Government and DPs MoU on the JAST, 2006 p.5). 
[..] The problem is…..we may implement what they (donors) want. If they will 
say “this particular issue is important” then you have to do it. However, you may 
have different opinions. Because you need funds, you are forced to do it […] 
(Official, MoFEA).  
The detailed findings of this study have been published elsewhere (Goddard and 
Mkasiwa, forthcoming) and only the relevant main aspects are reported here. The 
central phenomenon which emerged to understand the affect of the reforms on 
accounting practices was one of ‘struggling for conformance’. ‘Struggling for 
conformance’ was the process by which organizational actors’ were determined to 
implement the budgetary reforms and comply with donors’ requirements despite 
encountering enormous difficulties. It is illustrated by the following quote: 
[… ] We agree with them (DPs) about specific indicators…..we are struggling our 
best to make sure that we are meeting our Performance Assessment Framework 
(PAF) indicators.      […] (Official, MoEVT). 
Difficulties were observed in three areas: focusing on the medium term period, 
linking inputs with results and measuring output and outcome. Despite these 
difficulties, participants continued to implement the reforms to enhance their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the donors and hence ensure funding and also to enhance 
legitimacy by appearing to be like other countries as a result of perceptions on 
globalization. There was also evidence that organizational actors did believe in the 
reforms to improve internal efficiency: 
[…]MTEF…..if it would have been prepared and implemented carefully, 
would have given us the best results […] (Official, MoFEA). 
The core phenomenon refers to ‘struggling’ as organisational actors were committed 
to the reforms through necessity and struggled to implement them, rather than more 
overtly resisting them as found by prior research (Broadbent and Laughlin 1998, 
Jones 2006, Andersson and Tengblad 2009, Sharma et al 2012). This is not to say 
what could potentially be interpreted as resistive behaviour did not exist. For instance 
‘gaming’ and the setting of rhetorical rules is often interpreted as resistive behaviour 
with a view to stopping or at least hindering implementation in research undertaken in 
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Western organisations. Nor is it to say that participants believed the reforms were 
desirable or even appropriate (though there was some evidence they were thought 
capable of improving organisational efficiency). Rather, in Tanzania, the motivation 
for such behaviour was primarily a desire to manage the implementation as best they 
could and not to hinder it. Failure to implement the reforms, particularly if due to 
overtly resistive behaviour was likely to result in loss of funding and its disastrous 
consequences (Goddard and Mkasiwa, forthcoming). 
 
There were three main strategies, which explained how struggling for conformance 
was enacted: establishment of rhetoric rules and regulations; manipulating the 
measurement of performance and the playing of budgeting games.  Various rules and 
regulations such as manuals, guidelines, Acts, circulars, and establishment of new 
units were established to guide the implementation of performance budgeting, cash 
budgeting and MTEF reforms.  However, the use, perceptions and impacts of these 
rules and regulations hindered these efforts and made the rules and regulations more 
rhetorical. This strategy was characterised by the establishment of inadequately-used 
and or negatively/insignificantly-perceived guidelines; inadequately-used manuals; 
inadequately- and/or negatively-used acts and policies; insignificantly-perceived and 
adversely-affecting circulars; and ineffectively perceived, supervisory units. One 
example illustrates negatively- used policies with respect to of allocations for poverty 
reduction;  
[…] Resources allocated to MKUKUTA (A national strategy for poverty 
reduction), as a percentage of total expenditure, have remained almost 
constant in the last three financial years ..… it is astounding that such 
allocations…..are concentrated at the central government level, instead of 
going to LGAs where the actual job of poverty alleviation is being made […] 
(Donors, The Citizen, 20
th
 February, 2010). 
Measurement of outcome and impacts was complex and actors often opted for 
reporting performance based on inputs rather than outputs/outcomes/impacts. 
Sometimes, the rhetorical words output and outcome were used in reports while in 
reality inputs were being measured.  
 
Several examples of budgeting games were found. For example, personal allowances 
allocation – special request – ring-fencing was a three-stage game played by the 
Ministries, Independent Departments and Executive Agencies, MDAs and Treasury. 
The game started during budget preparation when participants rewarded themselves 
by including allowances, such as extra duty and per-diem payments in the budgets. 
This practice emerged as a result of low salaries and as an incentive to foster 
participation in the budgeting preparation.  Allowances were included in the budgets 
by MDAs at the expense of core activities. Then, during budget execution, special 
requests to the Treasury were sent by MDAs so as to fund the core activities as most 
of funds had been allocated for allowances. It was difficult for the Treasury to decline 
“special requests” from MDAs due to the significance of the core activities. However, 
the increasing trend of special requests by MDAs forced the Treasury to adopt a ring-
fencing strategy. This was the last part of the game in which the Treasury was forced 
to allocate funds for specific items (core activities) on behalf of MDAs so as to make 
sure that core activities of the MDAs were fully funded. 
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Another example was the repetition game in the establishment of organizational 
targets. This involved using the same figures in the budget for a number of 
consecutive years. This was caused by the lack of resources and time available to 
develop performance targets alongside budgets. This caused participants to merely 
“copy and paste”. It was also complemented by a selective overseeing approach, as 
nobody cared about the details written in the budget papers. For example, the target of 
increasing treatment success of TB and Leprosy (in percentage) was the same in three 
consecutive MTEFs.  
 
‘End-of-year practices’ and reallocation was a game played due to funding 
uncertainties and meanings placed on the “capacity” of the spending unit. Much 
expenditure was incurred at the end of the year. More funds were also released in the 
fourth quarter. Ministries had to struggle to ensure that they utilized all the funds 
released by Treasury to be seen as ‘having capacity for funds utilization’ for 
considerations in the next year and avoid audit query. A huge amount of funds were 
reallocated near to the end of the year. Utilization of funds in an inappropriate way 
became much easier due to the pressure to use up the funds released by the Treasury. 
The strategy of establishing rhetoric rules and regulations is strong evidence of loose 
coupling whereby the rhetorical rules were loosely coupled to the actual practices. 
Four other areas of loose coupling were observed. Firstly, the PB system was loosely 
coupled with actual practices because of coupling another budgeting system (CB). 
Secondly, during budget preparation, PB was loosely coupled to the actual practices 
as the result of institutionalization of allowances in most of the activities, targets and 
objectives. This made the inputs loosely coupled to organizational objectives. Thirdly, 
allocations for the next two years of the MTEF period were ceremonial, because of 
unpredictability and uncertainties. The three-year time horizon of MTEF was also 
impracticable for monitoring and evaluation. Furthermore, the requirement for the 
preparation of three-year performance reports was not in operation. Loose coupling 
was not only a mediating tool between efficiency and legitimacy, but a mediating tool 
for conflicting rules, fragmented environment and intra-organizational power 
relations.  
 
The ‘struggle’ at the heart of the grounded theory can be interpreted in terms of 
Ekeh’s two public. At a deep level CG participants were trying to implement new 
institutional rules and routines which emanated from the same external sources as 
colonialism i.e. the developed West. Such reforms are therefore associated with the 
civic public and alien to the primordial values of staff, inevitably leading to a struggle 
with implementation. Indeed, the commitment to the reforms was always likely to be 
limited and the rhetorical nature of their implementation also inevitable.  
 
However, it is in the budgetary gaming outlined above and indeed corruption that 
Ekeh’s insights are most evident.  In addition to the gaming tactics outlined above it 
was normal practice for politicians to intervene in the funds allocation exercise 
performed by the Treasury. Politicians bargained for more funds than the funds 
initially allocated by technicians, through the use of executives, instead of through the 
formal channels of the Treasury. The directions on funds allocations from executives 
to the Treasury came in the form of “orders”. The intervention of the politicians 
resulted in the distortion of priorities. This also resulted in the reshuffling of funds 
from one ministry to another, and a change in the initial ceilings allocated to 
individual ministries. Changes in ceilings forced reiteration of the budget preparation, 
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which had sometimes had to occur up to five times. It also resulted in the rushing of 
the budget preparation exercise because of the frequent changes into ceilings. During 
this period of rushing, the links between inputs and outputs and the allocations for the 
next two years were highly affected. The power of the politicians conflicted with 
implementation of the reforms process: 
 […] However, politicians will come and say “no”…. (they) will go to the 
executives (saying); “let me be given more money”. You know, we are 
planning for revenue and expenditure, revenue itself is limited, if you go to the 
executive and say; “let me given 25 billion or 30 billion”, while this year he 
had only 2 billion, that means you have to reduce from others and give it to 
him (to politician’s MDA), therefore priorities are distorted in this sense […] 
(Official,  MoFEA).  
As a result of insufficient funds and the low level of the economy, actors thought of 
ways to obtain more funds so as to fill the gaps between available funds and expected 
objectives. Writing proposals to donors was a dominant strategy adopted by actors. 
This was reflected in the following quote: 
 
[…] If we receive only a small amount of funding, we need to prepare a 
proposal so as to get more funding. If it is approved, the funding comes to this 
Department; it cannot go elsewhere […] (Director, MoEVT).  
This might be seen as an example the inevitable corruption that occurs when 
primordial and civic are in direct conflict. More examples of self interest at the 
expense of organizational objectives occurred further down the hierarchy when 
officials struggled to fulfill their personal objectives and engaged in the allowances 
game outlined above. The distortion of objectives of accounting change was caused 
by the complexity of the new rules, and also by the low salaries of officials.  
[…] Donors are paid $10,000/= (Approximately TZS. 15,000,000), Servants 
are paid TZS. 200,000/= per month … We buy in the same shops as they do. 
Do they want to buy in supermarkets alone? We are walking in the same roads 
as they do … We have to fight in order to get what we want. However, it is not 
the right way. We had to fight for salary increase rather than allowances […] 
(Director, MoEVT). 
 
Another example of such practices concerned the mobilization of budgetary reforms 
through allowances. The budget preparation task was rewarded with extra-duty 
allowances, as reflected in the following quote:  
[…] If I cannot pay the allowances, the budgets will not be completed. Who 
will stay here until late at night, and on weekends, without being paid? […] 
(Director, MoFEA).  
Budget preparation was a significant part of an employee’s life. Despite existing 
ambiguities and work pressure, organizational actors were motivated to prepare the 
budgets because of the expected rewards from the budgeting preparation task, which 
was a specially rewarded task even for budgeting staffs. Seminars, special tasks and 
training were the main sources of income and were crucial to organizational actors.  
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[…] We are just paid 200,000/= per month. How can I pay the rent? How can 
I pay school fees? What about petrol? What I receive from the budgeting 
exercise helps me throughout the year […] (Budgeting Officer, MoFEA).  
4.2 Local Government Authorities 
 
The research for this part of the study was undertaken through case studies of four 
Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): two municipal councils (KAMC 
and MDMC) and two district councils (KBDC and MCDC). The central government 
continues to play a significant part in LGAs. The LGAs are governed by full councils, 
which are made up of elected ward councillors, one member representing each 
constituent village or suburb council, members of parliament representing their 
jurisdictions and three members appointed by the minister responsible for local 
governments. Moreover, day to day administration of LGAs falls under the Council 
Executive Director who is appointed by the minister responsible for local government 
in consultation with the Local Government Service Commission. All LGAs are 
accountable to the Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local 
Government (PMO-RALG) through the office of Regional Administrative Secretary 
(RAS) located in each region. The PMO-RALG provided an oversight context of 
accounting in the LGA’s. In addition the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(MoHSW), Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) influenced 
accounting practices in health services delivery and education services respectively. 
Finally, the Local Authority Accounts Committee (LAAC), oversaw councils’ use of 
accounting in discharging LGAs’ accountability to the National Parliament. 
 
As with CG a major source of coercive isomorphism on LGA accounting were 
external donors, including amongst others the World Bank (WB), and countries such 
as Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Germany, Japan, and Finland, which 
jointly formed a ‘basket funding’ arrangement known as the Health Basket Fund 
(HBF). The donors’ influence originated from these funds, and was manifested 
through practices such as the adoption and implementation of the Integrated Financial 
Management Systems (IFMS), the establishment of the Councils’ Audit Committee, 
the introduction of the Local Government Development Grant (LGDG) systems, 
including conditional and performance based grants, the adoption of IFRSs and 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAs) and the introduction of the 
Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP).  
 
In the case of IFMS, the Government in collaboration with donors pioneered its 
introduction to the LGAs as a mechanism of addressing financial mismanagement, 
and to enhance reporting mechanism. The system was imposed on LGAs without 
sufficient preparation, which somewhat, constrained its effective implementation. 
Related to this was also poor coordination and ambiguous responsibilities regarding 
the administration of the system between the Government, Councils, and the external 
supplier of the system. There were also claims that the Councils’ officials resisted the 
effective implementation of the system because it limited the personal allowances and 
other discretionary expenditure.  
 
The LGAs’ financial reporting framework had also been subjected to external 
pressure from the Government and donors. The LGAs’ financial framework started as 
cash basis, and moved to the accrual basis following the country’s adoption of IFRSs 
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with effect from 1
st
 July, 2004. The rationale was to enhance the comparability of the 
financial information across different organizations. However, with effect from FY 
2008/09, the framework was changed to IPSAs, the reason being to strengthen the 
financial accountability of local governments through providing sufficient and reliable 
financial information within the context of public sector organizations in general. 
Again, there was no sufficient preparation in the process of change, something which 
constrained the effective implementation of IPSAs in the LGAs.  
 
Formal and informal pressures from the Government, donors, and politicians, were 
also imposed on the Councils’ budgetary practices. These pressures were normally 
embedded in the budget guidelines, which were perceived by the Councils’ officials 
as inappropriate and unrealistic. For example, the effective implementation of the 
participatory planning, which was imposed by the Government to the LGAs, was 
constrained by inadequate knowledge of the actors at the lower levels. The 
Government in collaboration with donors also introduced a formula based conditional 
grants system to the LGAs. According to the system, the amount of the discretionary 
grants which the Councils received depended on its fulfillment of the performance 
criteria, which include the Minimum Conditions (MCs) and the Performance 
Measures (PMs). Like other initiatives, the system was imposed to the LGAs without 
sufficient coordination with the overall organizational operations. As a result it was 
treated as a separate exercise by LGAs and was neither incorporated into the 
organizational principal administrative regulations, nor into the financial regulations. 
Legitimacy was at the core of understanding accounting practices in LGA. The 
research revealed that the effective operations of the Tanzanian LGAs were highly 
constrained by the factors such as funding uncertainties, political interference, fragile 
regulatory systems, and most of all donors’ influence. These had forced the LGAs’ 
officials to use important accounting practices such as financial reporting, auditing, 
budgeting and performance measurement, to manipulate the organizational legitimacy 
to ensure the availability of resources to both LGAs and the individual officials. This 
was the central phenomenon which emerged from the study and was labelled 
‘manipulating legitimacy’. This ensured the achievement of both the organizational 
interest [resources and survival] as well as individual financial and political interest. 
Manipulating legitimacy involved the purposeful and deliberate use of accounting 
techniques to influence and control (and sometimes even to falsify) the perceived 
reasonableness of the Councils’ operations. It is partly illustrated in the following 
quote: 
 
“You know, we have a lot of politics here, therefore, it is appropriate to under-
budget the Council’s own sources and meets the targets easily than to be 
realistic…If we collect below 80% of what we have budgeted for, the 
Council’s allocation for capital and development grants will be negatively 
affected. This leads to major problems in the Council and a number of the 
development projects will not be implemented. This will also amount to our 
salary deduction, and the external audit query.  Importantly, under-budgeting 
helps the Council to receive development grants and boost the economic 
development of our local community” (Rela, Assistant Revenue Accountant: 
KAMC) (emphasis added). 
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This indicates the manner in which the Councils’ officials used the accounting 
information, in this case budgetary practices, to manipulate the organisational 
legitimacy in order to obtain funds.  
Manipulating legitimacy has been implicitly discussed in the IT literature (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Deegan et al., 2002; Lindblom, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). 
For example, Suchman (1995) was of the opinion that the organisational legitimacy 
can be gained through manipulation techniques. This occurs when an organisation 
manipulates the existing external structures by creating new organisational 
legitimating beliefs. The legitimating beliefs aim to persuade the external stakeholders 
on the appropriateness of the organisation. Also, Oliver (1991) acknowledged the 
possibility of the institutionalized organizations to use the manipulation techniques to 
address the institutional pressures. 
 
The process of manipulating legitimacy in the LGAs comprised two main strategies, 
namely, ‘building the organizational image’ and ‘managing the organizational 
performance’. Whilst the former focused on creating an externally favorable image of 
the Councils in order to attract more resources from the Government and donors, the 
latter concentrated on controlling the internal problems which threatened the 
performance of the Councils.  
 
‘Building the organisational image’ describes the attempts of the organisational 
participants to portray a favourable image of the Councils to their external 
stakeholders in order to accrue resources. A number of sub-strategies were identified 
within the overall strategy including for instance maintaining the claims of 
accountability.  Councils were consistently and deliberately claiming direct 
accountability to the general public.  
 
The claims were normally communicated to the fund providers through the Councils’ 
budgets, including a number of activities to be undertaken at the lower levels of 
Wards and Villages although these were not normally implemented. Having created 
the claims through the budgets, the Councils acquired the legitimacy from the fund 
providers that they were more accountable to, or at, the lower levels, something which 
assured them the availability of resources. 
 
A number of techniques were used to manage the organisational performance 
including aggressive fund management, lobbying, and the playing of compliance 
games. One example of aggressive fund management was the practice of ‘teeming 
and lading’ where the late disbursement from an external funder motivated the 
Councils’ officials to take funds from one source to finance the activities of another. 
The practice worked on the assumption that the taken funds would be returned when 
the appropriate funds became available. This was evident during a conversation with a 
Municipal Medical Officer of the KAMC: 
 
“The main problem we are facing in our Councils in general is the late 
disbursement of funds. Funds from donors and Government are insufficient 
and untimely disbursed. Mind you, these funds are very important for smooth 
running of health facilities. What we do, normally we take funds from 
available sources with the anticipation of returning them later when funds 
from a respective source become available. Otherwise, we have to close the 
health facilities” (Lua, Municipal Medical Officer: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
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There were also concerns among the various LGAs’ stakeholders that the audit opinions 
issued to the Councils were inappropriate.  The councils’ officials were also involved in 
playing legitimacy compliance games in auditing, budgeting, and financial reporting. 
In auditing, for example, despite the fact that the Councils’ internal auditors lacked 
sufficient technical competence and appropriate facilities to undertake a performance 
audit, the internal audit reports included a clause indicating that one had been 
undertaken. This was in response to the regulations which required the Councils’ 
internal auditors to undertake a performance audit and indicate this in their quarterly 
internal audit reports. Similarly, the effective implementation of the participatory 
planning was constrained by inadequate knowledge of the officials at the lower levels 
and tight budget timeframes. To counter this, and because the participatory budget 
was one of the funding conditions of both the Government and donors, the Councils’ 
officials involved the lower levels only ceremonially and their suggestions were either 
ignored or subjected to formal and informal revisions at the Council level. 
 
Furthermore, despite the inherent weaknesses facing the implementation of IPSAS, all 
financial statements of the Tanzanian Councils were stamped as ‘fully IPSAS 
compliant’. These compliance games were intended to convince the supervisory 
bodies and fund providers that the Councils complied with the regulations as required, 
a claim which guaranteed the availability of resources. In contrast to what Granlund 
(2001) and Lukka (2007) witnessed, the legitimation techniques practiced in the case 
organizations were not primarily intended to block the changes introduced in the 
organizations, rather, they were employed to maintain the organizational operations 
given uncertainties of the funding sources.  
 
Loose coupling was evident in the LGAs in several areas. For example, it was 
apparent that organisational actors in the KAMC and MDMC were intentionally 
resisting or avoiding the day to day usage of the IFMS/EPICOR. Few ‘sensitive’ 
transactions were posted to the systems to avoid maximum pressures from the 
Controller and Auditor General (CAG) and Regional Financial Management 
Specialists (RFMSs). This was attributed to the fact that the system did not allow 
certain expenditures which were deemed necessary and important. As a result, the 
manual system was used in parallel with the IFMS/EPICOR. 
 
In addition, budgeting related problems, such as political interferences, inadequate 
knowledge of the lower levels, and unrealistic ceilings, forced the Councils’ officials 
to decouple formal budgeting arrangements with actual practices. For example, 
political interference from the Councillors and higher Government officials distorted 
the formal budgeting process, something which necessitated the maintenance of the 
two budgeting documents in order to meet the budgeting deadline. Also, the 
ceremonial involvement of the lower levels due to their inadequate knowledge 
legitimated the Councils’ budget. Similarly, the formal structures of the performance 
measurement practices were not effectively integrated in the daily operations of the 
Councils. The performance assessment merely consisted of the checklists of the 
Minimum Conditions (MCs) and the Performance Measures (PMs) which evaluate the 
Councils’ operations on annual basis.  
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The position of LGAs with regard to Ekeh’s two publics is an interesting one. It 
certainly has strong elements of the civic public as it is closely related to the post 
colonial state. Indeed this is enhanced in Tanzania by the embeddedness of the state 
apparatus through the inclusion of CG/state representatives on the Council and the 
appointment by CG of the Chief Executive. However, there are also strong elements 
of the primordial public, particularly at lower levels of the hierarchy and at the 
smaller District LGAs. This is reflected in very core phenomenon of ‘manipulating 
legitimacy’. ‘Manipulating’ infers a purposeful intention to falsify aspects of 
legitimacy and this was certainly evident in the research findings. Such intention to 
falsify is certainly made easier when such actions are directed at the amoral civic state 
in order to protect the moral primordial public. The perceptions of us (LGA) and them 
(CG and external donors) was strongly evident as illustrated above.  
 
However, as with CG, Ekeh’s two publics are most evident in the areas of 
organizational gaming and fraud and corruption. Gaming was at the heart of 
‘manipulating legitimacy’ and in the strategies adopted for its management. Many 
examples of such gaming are provided in the above discussion including legitimacy 
compliance gaming and teeming and lading.  
 
Fraud and corruption incidences were much more evident than in CG and emerged as 
one of the main consequences of the strategies employed in the process of 
manipulating legitimacy. The Councils’ audited accounts from the FY 2005/06 to the 
FY 2009/10 show a number of fraud and corruption related incidences in areas such 
as development and social projects, revenue outsourcing arrangements, and salaries. 
The fraud and corruption incidences had largely affected both the efficient 
undertaking of the Councils’ development and social projects, and the revenue raising 
ability of the Councils. For example, the CAG reports of the last five financial years 
showed that the majority of the LGAs’ projects were below standard, and the 
substantial revenues of the Councils were not remitted by the collecting agents as a 
result of inappropriate contracts entered between the Councils and private collectors. 
The emergence of fraud and corruption was partly attributed to the presence of 
unfavourable working conditions and inherent weaknesses of the internal control 
systems, while the technocrats and the Councillors’ personal interests facilitated its 
occurrence: 
 
“During the assessment, the Council officials are very anxious. As you know, 
most of our technocrats are not clean. In one of the Council, I caught two 
members of the Parliamentary Committee taking financial bribery from the 
Council’s officials. You know, the technocrats are ready to give everything in 
order to portray impressive performance” (Miv, Member of Parliament: 
LAAC) (emphasis added). 
 
The truth of this comment was demonstrated shortly after the end of the fieldwork, 
when the PCCB caught one of the Parliamentary Committee members taking a 
financial bribe from the officials of the Council which was going to be visited by the 
Committee. Collusion was also evident, involving inappropriate arrangements 
between the members of the organizations and third parties, with revenue outsourcing 
arrangements claimed being highly affected by these practices as implied in the 
following quote: 
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“I noted weaknesses on revenue collections outsourced to agents on behalf of 
the Councils. This area was noted to reflect unfavourable contracts which 
benefited agents more than the Councils. The ability of the Councils to funds 
its operation using internal sources of revenues is hampered by inadequate 
internal controls over revenues collection” (Annual General Report of the 
CAG on the Financial Statements of LGAs for the Financial Year ended 30
th
 
June 2010; p. 105) (emphasis added). 
 
Collusion practices were also prevalent in construction projects, where it was claimed 
in one LGA that the Councils’ Engineers had given confidential information to the 
private contractors who bid for the construction projects advertised by the Council.. 
The issue of the low quality (substandard) of the Councils’ development projects, 
which was partly associated with selecting inappropriate suppliers as a result of 
collusion, was one of the repeated audit queries in the Tanzanian LGAs.  
Corruption emanating from the perceived morality of favouring the interests of the 
primordial public over the civic public was also evident. For instance, Councillors 
were highly criticized for interfering with the Councils’ operations and budgeting: 
  
“Councillors are destroying the smooth running of the Councils…After the 
end of the budget preparation, the Mayor normally demands certain projects to 
be implemented in his Ward… As a Council official, you have to find a means 
to do that, otherwise, you will enter into an endless trouble with these 
powerful politicians” (Sega, Economist: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
The conflict between the two publics within LGAs is illustrated by the following 
comment: 
 
“We have a big problem here. Technocrats are corrupt and there is no place to 
make them accountable…Higher Government bodies are not ready to take 
actions based on our recommendations…We are coming from a different 
mother and whatever we recommend to them, is simply treated as ‘politics’. 
They want to show the general public that opposition is nothing” (Jofe, 
Council Mayor: MDMC) (emphasis added). 
 
More interference was noted during the budget preparation, where the Councillors 
were keen to push for high allocation of resources in their respective wards. There 
were also incidences of higher officials requesting funds from the LGAs for financing 
non-budgeted expenditures. In order to protect their interest, they were forced to 
comply with these requests. 
 
4.3 NGO’s 
 
This study was undertaken through case studies of three NGOs in Tanzania. The first 
was set up in 1991 with the overall mission of building a reading culture in Tanzania, 
targeting children of all ages. It assists in the acquisition, production and distribution 
of reading material for children; encouraging and supporting indigenous authorship 
and publishing of children reading material. It generally promotes the love of books 
and reading among Tanzanian children. The second was established in 1992 and its  
main objective was to advance the general welfare of women and to serve as a 
catalyst for improving their living conditions. Its operations were in development 
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work and advocacy. The last NGO was established in 1987 with the primary concern 
was with violence against women. It provided shelters as well as undertaking public 
education and advocacy work. As well as the three case study NGOs; three donor 
agencies, two government regulatory bodies and an accounting board were used as 
data sources. All three organisations generated little income from their own sources 
and were sustained by grants from donor agencies. The budget was therefore a critical 
tool in obtaining resources.  
 
There were three types of budgets in use; the annual organisation-wide budget; the 
programme activities budget; and the once-off-activity budget.  The programme 
activities budget was the critical budget. It attempted to match programme activities 
with donor funding interests because each of the donors funds particular activities and 
not others. It was not uncommon for different donors to fund the same programme 
activities. The budget therefore was a 'funds soliciting' tool rather than a financing 
target to be achieved. It was what funding agencies were willing to provide that was 
critical and establishing a good reputation and contacts was therefore a crucial part of 
an NGO's top management. The size of the programme budget submitted to donors 
was also intended to send an important message to established institutional donors 
about growth prospects of an NGO. As one executive confided the programme budget 
had to be seen to grow and the organisation therefore has to ensure a bigger budget 
was submitted on a year-by-year basis. Donors agreed an indicative plan for a five or 
three-year circle and reviewed a detailed plan for each year as it approached. 
Financial reports to donors followed the format of the agreed programme activities 
budget, which is the reason why expenditure analyses in the organisations were based 
on funding source. Operations of NGOs were heavily dependent on donors' financial 
contributions. Donors therefore possessed substantial power associated with their 
conferring of resources to NGOs. Moreover, being ‘in the good books’ of a donor of 
high standing conferred a form of organisational credibility on an NGO.  
 
Two government offices handled matters related to NGOs; the office of the Vice 
President, which has an NGO Division headed by a Commissioner and the office of 
the Registrar of Clubs and Societies in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Moreover, since 
NGOs had become an important organisational player active in the social services 
sector, government officials were interested in their operations. Accountability of 
NGOs had been a major consistent demand of the Government. As a Commissioner in 
one of the regulatory agencies stated:  
 
'It is the government [through the Registrar] that gives an NGO the mandate to 
operate.  If the NGO does not deliver the expected services, then the government has 
the right to demand an explanation'.  
 
 However, the government's interpretation of its status is a contested one; NGOs and 
other stakeholders question the legitimacy of the government’s claims.  The 
government's legitimacy to a financial reporting relationship was questioned as not 
being of a co-operative spirit but a domineering and 'policing' nature. Consistent 
accounting failure within the government itself, leading to theft and abuse, was cited 
as a weak moral ground on which the government could call for enhancement of 
accountability in other organisations. The government was relatively ‘hands off’ the 
internal accounting practices of the NGOs and only took a minor role in the financial 
reporting requirements.  
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Donors were therefore provided an important isomorphistic pressure in determining 
specific accounting practices in NGOs, and CG much less so. However, NGOs 
responded by adopting other accounting practices which they thought would enhance 
their legitimacy in the eyes of donors in order to attract more funds. This was more 
akin to mimetic isomorphism.    
 
The main findings of this study have already been published elsewhere (Assad and 
Goddard 2006) and only the relevant main aspects are reported here. The core 
phenomenon that emerged from the study was the basic process of navigating 
legitimacy. This related to how and the extent to which NGOs succeeded in accessing 
resources from donors and the modes by which these organisations justified resource 
utilisation to a spectrum of stakeholders. The organisations solely depended on 
donated resources for their existence and resource management and utilisation were 
critical aspects in the way organisations attained, lost, maintained or enhanced 
legitimacy. Accounting was implicated in navigating legitimacy in the resource-
attaining phase as well as in the justification for resource utilisation. First, it was a 
communicating facility for expressing the scale and activities of resource need via 
budget submissions. Secondly, it was the primary channel for reporting resource 
utilisation not only to donors but also to other stakeholders. Since these organisations 
could not survive without donated resources the process of justifying resource 
utilisation necessarily also justified organisational existence. Thirdly, the perceived 
strength or otherwise of the accounting function was itself an important tool in 
symbolising organisational competence - competence to handle and properly 'account' 
for entrusted resources. In this respect accounting acted as a legitimating tool and 
when it was perceived to be adequate it enhanced organisational legitimacy. The flow 
of accounting information and reporting mirrored the flow of resources. Speed, 
frequency and intensity of accounting reporting reflected the significance 
organisations accorded to different stakeholders. The more significant the stakeholder 
the more influential they were in determining the legitimacy status of organisations 
and the more accounting activity appeared to be directed to them. 
 
NGOs had moved beyond manipulating legitimacy to a more proactive management 
or navigation of it. This reflects the relative independence of the organisations from 
donors and CG and the more confident position they adopted.  In all NGOs there was 
therefore an on-going process of incorporating 'sound' accounting practices into 
organisations. The changes were often initiated by institutional donors and can be 
seen as pursuits to accommodate donor interests in order to maintain organisational 
legitimacy. Being perceived as a competent entity was a key element for the 
attainment of a legitimate status and incorporating 'sound' accounting practices 
conveyed that sense of a competent entity - an entity that could be trusted to keep 
proper records and account for finances entrusted to it. Organisations therefore 
incorporated sound accounting practices as legitimating devices.  
 
Two strategies were employed by organisations to manage the process of navigating 
legitimacy. These comprised two interrelated and progressive stages or sub-processes 
– building and rebuilding credibility; and bargaining for change. These reflect the 
ways organisations created and managed good impressions with stakeholders before 
seeking their long-term commitment and attempting to bargain with them, to create a 
less burdensome accounting and reporting environment. Building and rebuilding 
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credibility comprised five sub-strategies were identified whereby organisations sought 
to build and rebuild credibility. These were judicious conformity with accounting 
requirements; character witnessing; managing the audit; improving organisational 
governance; fostering a distinct cultural identity and engendering trust. The process of 
bargaining for change comprised four specific bargaining sub-strategies. These are 
selling the 'basket funding' idea; joint venturing one-off projects; selective rejection of 
project-format funding; and stalling the NGO policy initiative. 
 
It is noteworthy that accounting changes associated with these strategies did not result 
in making accounting important in internal decision processes. The installation of a 
computerised accounting system in one NGO, for example, ought to have made easier 
the accumulation and analyses of programme costs. Yet, it remained only a facility to 
perform faster nearly the same processes that the accountant previously performed 
manually - production of expenditure reports by donor source. Nevertheless, 
computerisation was, on its own, of symbolic significance as an institutionalised 
aspect of modern day competent organisations.  
 
A related aspect of legitimation by organisations that emerged from the research was 
that of using professional experts - consultants. Although recommendations of these 
experts were not always implemented the consultation process had a ritual 
significance as well. This also concurs with Meyer and Rowan (1977) who suggest 
that: 
 
[…] highly professionalized consultants who bring external blessings on an 
organization are often difficult to justify in terms of improved productivity, yet 
may be very important in maintaining internal and external legitimacy (p. 355). 
 
The appointment of auditors was yet another aspect of use of professional experts that 
organisations appeared to manage to portray legitimacy. During the research two 
organisations had appointed multinational audit firms in place of local audit firms. 
The underlying justification had little to do with professionalism or opinion shopping. 
The justification for auditor change was rather the perceived positive effect on the 
organisations’ legitimacy as a result of being audited by renowned multinational audit 
firms.  
Loose coupling did not emerge as an important aspect in this study, other than the 
observation that accounting changes which could have enhanced internal decision 
making were not so utilised (see above). This was probably due to the perception of 
accounting as merely a legitimating device to obtain more funds rather than 
something of additional use to the NGO.   
 
Fraud and corruption also did not emerge as important phenomena. This was probably 
due to the more coherent location of the NGOs firmly in the primordial public. The 
values of participants were in tune with this primordial public. Any attempts to steal 
or game with the resources of the NGO would be to the detriment of the primordial 
public and therefore immoral. Moreover, the colonial state was perceived as almost 
entirely external to the organisations, other than in the case of donors, as a source of 
funds. Gaming, by navigating legitimacy, in order to obtain such civic funds and 
enhancing the primordial NGOs was again a moral act.       
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Legitimacy played a central role in understanding accounting practices in all of the 
sectors studied. In all cases it was also defined in terms of the perceptions of donors 
and how they defined legitimacy. However, these perceptions did vary across the 
sectors. In CG it was closely associated with global NPM initiatives and focused on 
planning and budgeting mechanism with an emphasis on performance outputs and 
outcomes. In LG it was more concerned with accountability mechanisms and with 
financial reporting. In NGOs it was more broadly related to donors’ perceptions of 
what constituted an organisation worthy of funding and included all aspects of 
accounting and auditing. As can be seen the differing approaches donors took to 
legitimacy resulted in different accounting practices across the three sectors.   
 
It is perhaps useful to return to Scott’s three ‘pillars’ (or ways of understanding) 
institutions and legitimacy in relation to the three sectors. The first pillar with a 
regulatory emphasis on conformity to rules was evident in all three sectors. All case 
studies adopted new organisational accounting rules to enhance their legitimacy.  The 
second normative pillar, stressing a deeper, moral base for legitimacy, was strongly 
evident in CG where participants struggled to conform to the new rules. However it 
was far less evident in LG where manipulation was more evident than any moral 
commitment. In NGOs there was even less moral commitment to the rules, rather 
participants only accepted the rules in so far as it resulted in funding. Indeed in NGOs 
legitimacy was seen as something to be actively managed rather than something 
handed down from above. Similar differential responses were even more evident with 
respect to the cognitive-cultural pillar, stressing the legitimacy which comes from 
adopting a common frame of reference (Scott 2001). It seems that the further 
institutions were from the central state the less the commitment to donor-perceived 
legitimacy and associated accounting changes imposed from outside.  
 
Legitimacy and isomorphism are closely related (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The fact 
that in all sectors, donors impose accounting change informed by NPM concepts on 
organisations is clear evidence of coercive isomorphism. However, coercive 
isomorphism was most evident in CG where implementation was closely overseen. 
Mimetic and normative isomorphism was more evident in LGAs and particularly in 
NGOs. Indeed in NGOs, in order to navigate legitimacy organisations had not only to 
adopt the coerced practices but also chose to copy other practices (such as using major 
accounting forms for consultancy and audit) used by external organisations deemed to 
hold high levels of legitimacy.   
   
The success of these isomorphistically informed accounting changes was undermined 
by loose coupling. However, again there was a differential response with respect to 
loose coupling across the three sectors. In CG it was a factor but mainly resulted from 
an inability to conform to the new complex rules rather than a deeper antipathy to the 
changes themselves. In LGAs loose coupling was far more extensive. Indeed the core 
phenomenon of manipulating legitimacy by manipulation of accounting practices is 
itself an example of loose coupling. Such extensive use suggests a deeper hostility to 
the changes than was found in CG. In LGAs, loose coupling was almost non-existent 
in respect of changes imposed by senior managers not being accepted by more junior 
managers. This was because the changes were never intended to change the 
organisation, rather to obtain more funds.  
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An obvious question is why there were such differences between perceptions of 
legitimacy, isomorphism and loose coupling and the related accounting practices 
across the three sectors. Ekeh’s two publics provide such an explanation and also help 
to understand the high levels of gaming and corruption found in all sectors. As 
outlined above officials working in public sector organisations are subject to the 
values and perceptions of morality associated with each of the two publics. However, 
CG is far more associated with the post colonial state and the civic public, than NGOs 
which are more closely associated with the primordial public. Those working in CG 
are not only subject to norms and rules of the civic public but are themselves more 
committed to them, particularly at more senior levels. Rather than be in conflict with 
the associated accounting changes managers were committed to them and struggled to 
implement them. LGAs are closer to the primordial public but still retain strong 
association with the civic. Officials were in conflict over the norms and rules of the 
two publics, and consequently in conflict over the accounting practices. They were far 
less committed to any changes imposed by the civic public and manipulation and high 
level of gaming and loose coupling was inevitable. NGOs were much more associated 
with the primordial public. Officials were committed to the norms and vales of the 
organisation and there was little internal conflict. This resulted in little internal 
gaming and loose coupling, rather gaming occurred only with external donors 
associated with the civic public. 
 
The ‘two public’ analysis also assists an understanding of differential levels of 
corruption across the three sectors. As outlined above a distinguishing characteristic 
of the primordial institutions is a strong moral purpose including a moral 
responsibility on the part of individuals to ensure collective well being. In contrast the 
civic public is amoral and lacks the moral imperatives of the primordial public, 
leading to opportunistic, lawless and corrupt tendencies. In CG examples of 
corruption were found but were not as prevalent as LGAs. This was partly due to the 
relative coherence of norms and morality between CG officials and the civic state but 
also due to the relative ease with which close control over the implementation was 
possible. Corruption was most prevalent in LGAs. This was partly due to the 
conflicting norms between primordial officials and the civic donors and also to the 
difficulties the civic state encountered in monitoring the more distant LGAs. NGOs 
encountered very few problems of corruption other than a desire to subvert resources 
from the civic public wherever possible.  Participants did not face the same tensions 
as those in central and local government as the institutions in which they operate are 
conducive to their primordial roots and values and a stronger sense of moral 
responsibility might exist. It was also due to the more extreme distance between the 
institutions and the civic state and donors. The above analysis suggests that the 
application of accounting and accountability procedures and processes, developed in 
societies without a bifurcation of publics is inevitably problematic, with resistance 
stronger the greater the distance from the state. 
 
It is interesting to consider the implications of this research for practice. In the case of 
NPM the immediate concern is whether this neo-liberal inspired initiative is 
successful in the developed world where research to date suggests it is, at best, 
unproven. If this is the case it is very unlikely to prove successful in the public sectors 
of developing countries where bureaucratic resources are relatively limited. A more 
pertinent point is whether any reform imposed from the developing world is likely to 
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be successful. The evidence from this research is that it is unlikely if it is tainted with 
the civic public. This may be due to the use of the state to impose the reform, as in 
CG and LGAs, or the direct imposition by donors associated with the colonial state as 
in the case of NGOs. If there is an answer to this conundrum it is surely for the 
developed world to support institutions and professions in the developing world to 
develop their own practices rather than imposing them. These practices are then more 
likely to take societal values, history and local context into account.      
  
This is even truer in the case of attempts to overcome corruption in the developing 
world.  Such attempts have often been criticised for taking a neo- patrimonial view of 
corruption (Theobold 1999, Doig and McIver 1999). However, the research reported 
in this paper suggests that corrupt practices are much more endemic and deeply rooted 
in society. They are rooted in the conflicts between the primordial and civic 
perceptions of morality and particularly with donors being perceived as part of the 
immoral civic public. It is difficult to see an easy or short term solution to such 
corruption. Rather a long term view, concentrating on changing the perceptions of 
civic morality appears to have most chance of success. This might involve donors 
work closely with institutions to develop their own practices rather than imposing 
them from outside. It would also be beneficial to support, without managing or 
imposing, accounting institutions and professions in the developing world as there is 
some evidence that good accounting reduces corruption rather than specific reforms. 
For instance Kimbro (2012) found that, inter alia, countries that had good financial 
reporting standards, and a higher concentration of accountants to be less corrupt. 
Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010)  in their study of accountability in the public sector of 
Nigeria found that, ‘accountability in public expenditure could be more easily realized 
within the context of a sound accounting infrastructure and a robust accounting 
profession and not in the multiplicity of laws and anti-corruption agencies’. 
 
In conclusion, institutional theory concepts of legitimacy, loose coupling and 
isomorphism are useful in understanding accounting practices in public sector 
accounting in developing countries in Africa. However, they are insufficient for a 
deeper understanding of these practices within a post colonial context which 
comprises a complex cultural and political society. Ekehs concepts of two publics, 
alongside concepts from institutional theory, provides such a deeper understanding, 
particularly by introducing the concept of morality which has important impacts on 
accounting.  
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